Передмова

Наявність чіткої інтегральної стратегії національної безпеки на перспективу нині стає необхідною передумовою сталого прогресу і розвитку будь–якої держави. Стійка динаміка останньої неможлива без чіткого бачення її ролі та місця у сучасному світі, без системної оцінки її перспективи.

Розробка відносно стабільної, несуперечливої та самоузгодженої системи національних інтересів, пріоритетів і цілей є визначальним завданням політичної еліти в процесі державотворення.

Чітко визначені й консолідовані в масовій свідомості національні інтереси та цінності повинні складати основу будь–якої інтегральної стратегії національної безпеки, ефективну імплементацію якої мають забезпечити спільні зусилля виконавчої та законодавчої влад.

Збереження та зміцнення державного суверенітету не означає самоізоляції країни від міжнародного співтовариства, а навпаки — створює сприятливі передумови для динамічного розвитку її відносин зі світом згідно із загальновизнаними нормами міжнародного права та власним розумінням своїх національних інтересів, на засадах взаємовигідного співробітництва і безпеки.

З іншого боку, процеси, що відбуваються на теренах колишнього Радянського Союзу, включаючи й Україну, мають глобальний характер і пов’язані з об’єктивними потребами України, як й інших нових держав, якнайскоріше вбудуватися в демократичний європейський і світовий суспільний простір, від якого вони були примусово відірвані протягом десятиліть.

Посилення зв’язків взаємозалежності як між політичними, економічними, суспільними суб’єктами країни, так і на міжнародній арені, істотно впливає на процес визначення та реалізації державою своїх національних інтересів.

Класична концепція, згідно з якою держава як єдиний актор визначає власні інтереси і керується ними у міжнародній політиці, сьогодні перестає працювати, що незаперечно доводять експертні оцінки відомих вітчизняних та зарубіжних фахівців, які взяли участь у даній конференції.

Стає очевидним той факт, що національні інтереси окремо взятої країни, як і питання її національної безпеки, не можуть вирішуватися в ізоляції від інтересів інших держав чи їх блоків, з якими контактує дана країна, формуючи при тому своєрідне поле спільних параметрів у межах політичного простору.

Під час виступів та дискусій на конференції були сформульовані загальні вимоги до стратегії національної безпеки взагалі та України зокрема. Було водночас зазначено, що така стратегія повинна пов’язувати в єдине ціле економічні ресурси і демографічний потенціал, індустріальні можливості й фінансові обмеження, ідеологічні та моральні фактори, зовнішній та внутрішній чинники, соціальні, екологічні, науково–технологічні фактори і параметри із задоволенням вимог політики як за воєнних, так і за мирних часів, базуватися на врахуванні довгострокових інтересів держави.

Пропонована праця буде корисною для фахівців в Україні та за рубежем, які цікавляться питаннями розробки концепції національної безпеки, надто на перших визначальних етапах державотворення.

Сама конференція стала важливою віхою у процесі десятирічного становлення та діяльності Національного Інституту стратегічних досліджень.

Олександр БЄЛОВ, заступник Секретаря Ради національнї безпеки і оборони України, директор Національного інституту стратегічних досліджень

ВСТУПНА ДОПОВІДЬ ЄВГЕНА МАРЧУКА Україна

Радикальні перетворення, що відбуваються у сучасній Україні, спрямовані на розбудову розвиненого демократичного суспільства, забезпечення ефективного, сталого та безпечного розвитку України у світовій спільноті.

При цьому дії всіх ланок державного управління об’єктивно вимагають наявності чіткої інтегральної стратегії на перспективу, яка визначала б основні пріоритети, цілі та напрями розвитку держави і суспільства з урахуванням усіх параметрів внутрішнього та зовнішнього середовища та їх можливих змін.

Документом такого плану, відповідно до світової практики, є Стратегія національної безпеки держави — базовий програмний документ виконавчої гілки влади, який визначає методологічні й концептуальні орієнтири розвитку держави, окреслює загальні механізми імплементації життєво важливих національних інтересів.

Стратегія національної безпеки за визначенням повинна мати комплексний інтегральний характер і узгоджувати геополітичні орієнтації й економічні ресурси, внутрішні соціально–політичні та економічні параметри і зовнішньополітичні впливи, відносні оцінки власної сили, сили і слабкості інших, соціальні, моральні, ідеологічні, екологічні, науково–технічні та інші чинники.

Важливою особливістю такого документа є те, що стратегія має формувати у масовій свідомості бажану модель майбутнього, а також у найзагальнішій формі визначати місце та роль усіх суб’єктів суспільного життя у процесі її втілення у життя.

Таким чином, стратегія національної безпеки має сприяти психологічному єднанню нації навколо всім зрозумілих та суспільно значущих завдань, тобто бути суттєвим елементом національної ідеї, сприяти національній злагоді.

Інтерес у світі до розробки подібного типу документів постійно зростає. Наявність національної стратегії безпеки сьогодні стає необхідною передумовою успішного розвитку будь–якої держави.

Тільки останніми місяцями були розроблені чи радикально перероблені стратегії національної безпеки Польщі, Угорщини, Чехії.

Прийнята нова концепція національної безпеки Росії, яка за структурою та змістом більше нагадує стратегію національної безпеки і, разом з іншими програмними документами, складає програму дій на перспективу для нової російської адміністрації.

У грудні минулого року адміністрація Б. Клінтона запропонувала нову (вже третю за період перебування при владі) стратегію національної безпеки США під промовистою назвою «Стратегія національної безпеки на нове століття».

Розробка Стратегії національної безпеки України сьогодні є нагальною потребою часу. Вона має визначати геополітичні орієнтири, альтернативи і наслідки геополітичного вибору України, структуру загроз і викликів національним інтересам держави на найближчі десятиліття, а, головне, чітко сформулювати стратегічні напрями і пріоритети політики в усіх визначальних сферах національної безпеки — від внутрішніх трансформаційних процесів, соціально–економічних, військово–політичних і адміністративних реформ до проблем європейської інтеграції, співробітництва з міжнародними інституціями, структурами безпеки тощо.

Подібний документ став би логічним продовженням Послання Президента України Верховній Раді «Україна: поступ в XXI століття — стратегія економічного та соціального розвитку на 2000—2004 роки», «Стратегії інтеграції України до Європейського Союзу» та інших базових документів держави стратегічного значення.

Більше того, Стратегія національної безпеки України могла б стати відповідним концептуальним і методологічним підгрунтям до розробки цілої низки важливих державних документів, зокрема Воєнної доктрини України.

Важливим завданням, яке також має вирішувати Стратегія національної безпеки України, є підвищення рівня міжнародної інтеграції України та рівня міжнародної безпеки в цілому.

Все це надає сьогоднішній представницькій конференції особливого значення, від учасників якої ми хотіли б почути конкретні й прагматичні пропозиції.

Компаративний аналіз стратегій і особливостей реалізації політики національної безпеки країн Євроатлантичної спільноти, Центральної та Східної Європи, країн ГУУАМ, Російської Федерації та країн–учасниць Договору про колективну безпеку, без сумніву, сприятиме не тільки підвищенню рівня стратегічних розробок усіх країн–учасниць, але й позитивно впливатиме на зміцнення миру, безпеки і взаєморозуміння між ними

Ukraine’s National Security Strategy in the Context of the International Community Experience

Analysed are the proceedings of the international conference «Ukraine’s national security strategy in the context of the international community experience» held on 9—10 of October by the National Institute of Strategic Research together with Friedrich Ebert Institute in Ukraine.

The conference was opened by the welcome addresses of the Head of the National Security Council of Ukraine, Yevhen Marchuk and the Head of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine, W. Schneider–Deters, and of the Head of the National Institute of Strategic Research, O. Belov.

At the beginning of his address, Yevhen Marchuk noted that the steps of all the echelons of public administration are aimed at building a developed democratic society and ensuring an efficient, sustainable and secure development of Ukraine within the international community. They objectively call for a clear–cut, integrated, future–oriented strategy, which would set out main priorities, goals, directions of the state and social development with a bearing on all the parameters of internal and external environment and possible changes thereof.

In accordance with the world practice, a document to be developed along these lines would be a state national security strategy. It will outline methodological and conceptual guidelines for its development and identify general mechanisms for addressing national vital needs. The national security strategy, being a complex, integrated document, has to provide for a coordination of geopolitical orientations and economic resources, domestic social political and economic parameters and external political impacts, relative assessments of our own and external forces, as well as social, moral, ideological, environmental, scientific, technological and other factors.

Further on, E.Marchuk focused on the need for this strategy to shape in the public consciousness a sought—after model of the future and to define in most general terms the place and role of all social entities in the implementation of this model. Thus the national security strategy has to promote a psychological rallying of the nation together behind the universally understandable and socially meaningful objectives, i.e., to be the essential component of a national idea. Availability of the national security strategy has become the indispensable precondition for a successful development of any state.

E.Marchuk stressed that developing Ukraine’s national security strategy is one of today’s urgent challenges. It has to set out the geopolitical benchmarks, alternatives and implications of Ukraine’s geopolitical choice, the structure of threats and challenges to the state’s national interests for the coming decades, and what is crucial this strategy has also to provide a clear–cut formulation of strategic directions and political priorities in all the vital areas of national security ranging from the domestic transformation processes, social economic, military political and administrative reforms up to the issues of European integration, cooperation with international institutions and security structures.

Such a document would be a logical implication of the President of Ukraine address to the Verkhovna Rada «Ukraine—Advance into the XXI Century–Economic and Social Development Strategy for 2000—2004», and also of the strategy of Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and other fundamental documents of strategic importance. Furthermore, Ukraine’s national security can provide a conceptual and methodological basis for developing a series of important state documents, in particular Ukraine’s military doctrine.

In his welcome address O.Belov noted that there is a steadily growing concern on the part of the executive branch for the development of fundamental documents in the area of national security. Recent months have seen the elaboration or dramatic revision of national security strategies of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic. A new concept of national security has been adopted in Russia. By its structure and content it resembles more a national security strategy and along with other mission statement documents, which have been prepared by government and non–government think tanks, it constitutes an action plan to be pursued by the Russian administration in the future. In December of 1999 Clinton administration proposed a new strategy of national security, which is the third one during his term in office. It was expressly entitled «Strategy of national security for a new century.» Today there is an urgent need for Ukraine to develop such a document.

O.Belov went on to note that a comparative analysis at this conference of the strategies and peculiarities of the national security policies being pursued by member states of the European Atlantic community, Central and Eastern Europe, GUAAM countries and Tashkent pact will undoubtedly facilitate not only the task of upgrading the level of strategic research of all the member–states, but will also promote the strengthening of peace, security and mutual understanding among countries.

Discussing the specifics and priorities of the policy and national security strategies of the Euro Atlantic community, Central Europe, GUUAM, Russian Federation and member–states of the treaty on collective security (Tashkent pact), the participants of the conference focused on Ukraine’s considerable impact on the security in the above regions.

Doctor James Sherr stressed in his presentation that though a good deal has been done over nine years to improve the relations between the West and Ukraine, neither Great Britain nor the West on the whole have a clear conception concerning Ukraine’s geopolitical standpoint with regard to the West. Is the British national security strategy to blame for this? The answer to this question is partly in the affirmative, since during the cold war Great Britain lacked a clear–cut national security strategy. We often get the impression that Ukraine is more concerned about the integration into European structures than about undertaking concrete institutional changes she has to put in place in order to be integrated with Europe.

If those who speak about integration do not do a thing to adopt the Western standards of law, business practice, accountability and transparency, they only engage in proclaiming empty slogans. The lines of division in Central–Eastern Europe are being shaped today between those who produce slogans and those who make changes. Now there is a risk that these lines will transform themselves into barriers and a number of countries will find themselves on the wrong side of this barrier. If this is where the problem lies in, the challenge to the West is evident: by making use of the available institutions, in the first place NATO and European Union, one should oppose these tendencies and put our energy and efforts into the integration of those who really want to be integrated and leave the others to their own devices.

NATO remains an organization concerned with security. For this reason it is unlikely that the Alliance should foster investments into Ukraine or assist Ukraine in restructuring her industry or reducing unemployment. Therefore NATO cannot integrate Ukraine into Europe. But the Alliance can promote Ukraine’s integration in another important sense, i.e., assist Ukraine in designing an integrated, financially effective national security and defense structures, capable of dealing with today’s new, but real threats.

It is in the Ukrainian and European interests that Ukraine should possess the defense and security systems, sufficient for the protection of their borders and for controlling the effects of disasters and catastrophes in international environment, including local conflicts, or to convince external forces that the price of conflicts and other ways of interference may be too high for them to afford. Until Ukraine makes real steps along these lines, her road to Europe will be blocked.

Making use of his experience at NATO headquarters and the experience in the crisis development and its management in Kosovo, Doctor Chris Donnelly noted that international organizations such as NATO and European Council are but tools for the implementation of policies and decisions that are adopted by member states of these organizations.

Analyzing press digests and press coverage, Donnelly noted that the media people were largely in the wrong. For a long time they sought to spot differences in the standpoints of NATO countries. But while doing so, they mistook a process that was taking shape in NATO for the very outcome of NATO’s activity.NATO’s activity involves empowering its member–states to hold debates over their differences. What really happened in the course of a deepening crisis was that the member–states were drawing their positions increasingly closer and were elaborating an increasingly common option to deal with the problem in the Balkans and to ensure European security. They realized that settling the problems in the Balkans would be far from easy and would require a long period of time. They also realized that mechanisms to ensure security in the future are in short supply in this region. Likewise, they became aware of a certain disparity between Europe’s and USA potential in settling this issue. In addition, they came to realize that various countries were not unanimous about choosing ways to settle this problem and assumed responsibility to iron out all these contradictions among themselves. Thus, the campaign in Kasovo fastened the pace of Euro–Atlantic integration. In historical terms, the rate with which the integartion has been taking place over the past 18 months is absolutely astounding.

It is beyond all doubt that there are some security problems left in Europe. First of all, one has to bear in mind the security threats of non–military nature. The old military threats have vanished and as of today the issues that people are concerned about have to do with the Ministry of Home Affairs rather than with the Ministry of Defense. The armed forces of most European countries do not meet the challenges of present security–related issues. Over the past 10 years most European countries have not carried out any fundamental reforms of their armed forces. They have been reducing their armed forces with other things remaining the way they were in the cold war period.

Another problem has to do with the lack of adequate tools for addressing existing security issues. As of today there is no organization to perform effectively the policing functions. The countries involved are trying to work toward making their security structures better suited for the modern realities. But there is no clear–cut plan of bringing it about and of giving it any specific form of existence.

The Euro–Atlantic train is picking up its speed. The countries concerned should work more forcefully if they wish to catch this train. In the view of Donnelly, for this reason, if a central European country develops its national strategy, it has to become clearly aware of which part of this Euro Atlantic process it wishes to become and what steps it should undertake in this direction.

Doctor Carlo Bellinzona spoke about the specifics of Italy’s national strategy. He dwelled upon Italy’s peacemaking activity in Somalia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and eastern Timor. As to Ukraine, Dr. Bellinzona believes that Ukraine has become an important partner of Italy and European Union. The importance of this partnership has increasingly grown; therefore discussing the issue of Ukrainian national security strategy should not be limited to the concerns of our home policy. This discussion also involves the interests of Europe.

Dr. C. Bellinzona stressed the importance of cooperation between Ukraine and Italy. «I believe that in the present situation the area of Ukraine’s concerns is of real interest to European security, he stated, we are living at a time when security assumes global dimensions. For this reason we must extend our stabilizing influence on non–stable territories, which strategically are close to us, if geographically remote.» He stressed the importance of bilateral and multilateral relations in Europe, making a special emphasis on economic relations. Dr. C. Bellinzona also welcomed the initiative of strengthening GUUAM.

Stacy Closson noted that the region from Caspiy to Baltics has an immediate impact on European security. Ukraine is perceived by the USA as a vital strategic element. According to the latest version of the US national security strategy mention is made of strengthening Ukraine’s security. S.Closson stated that by 2015 the picture of threats will be enlarged. The issue of reforming the Ukrainian armed forces—their numerical strength, combat readiness and effectiveness–constitutes one of the important aspects of the relations between Ukraine and the USA. The presenter noted that the relationships between the USA and Ukraine are developing along three lines: as bilateral relations, as relations within the Partnership for Peace and through the structures of the European Council.

Rafal Domisiewicz noted that there could be no independent, sovereign Poland without an independent, sovereign Ukraine. Poland supports such fundamental principles of national security strategy as solidarity, integration, and cooperation. With Poland entering NATO, the Council of Ministers adopted a new security and defense strategy of the Republic of Poland. Further on, the speaker stressed that Poland supports further expansion of NATO.

With respect to Ukraine the speaker has made a few points. He noted in particular that the strengthening of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the ensuring of her territorial integrity are crucial to a new security environment in Europe. Poland supports Ukraine in her Euro Atlantic aspirations, favors Ukraine’s membership in the Council of Europe and her participation in the Central European initiative Weimer triangle. Poland will continue to uphold the Ukrainian party on the issue of entering the World Trade Organization.

Energetic security of Poland and Ukraine is another important aspect of our political and economic relations. We declare that new oil pipelines from Russia to Western Europe have to be built considering the economic and geostrategic interests of Ukraine. Poland is committed to deepening strategic partnership between Warsaw and Kyiv.

Ignas Stankovicius told the audience that the issue of developing Lithuanian National security concept had not been settled prior to the involvement of a non—government organization Baltic Regional Research Center, facilitated by an adviser to NATO Secretary General on Central and Eastern Europe. The Lithuanian example indicates that national security issues may be discussed rather from a national and state standpoint than from a party one.

Andras Deak noted in his paper that in Hungary there is the National Security Council that includes ministers as its members, but this is only a consultative body. Conceptual public documents are approved by the Government. These documents lay emphasis on regional aspects of domestic policies; for example, topical currently are the relations with Croatia and Austria. According to the estimates of local experts, threats and risks for Hungary are not military. The defense concept of the state has already been drawn up. It will be approved in several weeks.

In his paper Doctor Rustem Zhangozha has dwelt on the questions of the GUUAM, oil transport corridors of the Caspian shelf and Ukraine’s possible participation in the above association of countries, as well as oil transportation. Specifically, he said:

According to mass media, the former US President National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, a well–known political analyst, told the newsmen in Washington that the membership in the GUUAM should not be restricted only to post–Soviet countries. Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that such Black Sea countries, as Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, as well as Poland bordering with Ukraine, could join the GUUAM as observers. In Brzezinski’s opinion, these countries «to a certain degree» are interested in developing economic, technological, and political cooperation with the GUUAM. At the same time, Brzezinski points out that he «does not regard the GUUAM as an alternative to the CIS.»

According to the official statements of all member states of this organization, initially the GUUAM was established as only an economic association of nations–potential participants to the project of transporting oil and gas with the view of diversifying the sources of their export and import to bypass Russia’s territory. But, as Russian experts believe, the activities of this international association began to show some signs of military–political aspects. They became more prominent after Georgia and Azerbaijan had refused to continue to participate in the Collective Security Treaty, and Uzbekistan had withdrawn from the Treaty.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has also pointed out that the «GUUAM can be a real counterbalance to the Eurasian Economic Community.»

According to Kazakhstan mass media report, at the Tehnghiz oil deposit there has begun the feeding of oil into the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Oil–loading terminals in the Russian port of No-vorossiysk are the point of destination of the transported crude oil. The Kazakhstan oil will reach the port in June 2001.

Now economic analysts already say that with the commissioning of the Caspian pipeline, Kazakhstan has gained real independence in the most important industry — oil extraction and export of crude oil to consumer markets all over the world.

Given the circumstance, regrettable for Kazakhstan, is the fact that all other industries of the country are in a state of collapse. The increase in the volume of oil extraction can be regarded as a sure sign of success, primarily, a political breakthrough both in foreign and domestic policy terms.

The above–mentioned pipeline linking the richest oil deposit with the Russian sea port of Novorossiysk (from which oil is planned to be transported further by tankers through the Bosporus) is of exceptional importance in the competition for domination in the Caspian Sea region between Russia, on the one side, the United States and Turkey, on the other side, and Iran, on the third side. Its throughput at present and in the nearest future is higher than that of any other oil pipeline used for transporting oil to world markets. However, abstracting from the undoubtful importance of the «historical moment» noted by analysts, the situation that has arisen does not seem to be that simple, at least, for the parties which are now celebrating their success — Kazakhstan and Russia.

During the decade which has passed since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has persistently and straightforwardly striven to have the Caspian oil and gas transported to world markets through Turkey rather than Russia. It has not backtracked on its position on the question despite the preemptive move of its major rival – Russia, which initiated and effected the launching of the Tenghiz—Novorossiysk oil–main, alternative to the interests of the USA. Against all the odds, the USA has not abandoned its efforts to have an oil–mains constructed which would link the Azerbaijani zone of Caspian oil deposits with the Turkish oil terminal of Jeikhan on the Mediterranean Sea.

Considering the opportunities of major US rivals on the Caspian Sea and their readiness to influence the outcome of the competition for Caspian hydrocarbons, they differ essentially and do not appear to be rather great, as compared with nearly unlimited opportunities of the Americans. Let us take, for example, Russia. Wielding a still rather weighty political influence on the Caspian post—Soviet republics, this country does not possess sufficient material resources in order to entrench itself there as an indisputable leader. As for Iran, it is obviously doomed to a defeat in the competition with the USA because of economic and political sanctions imposed by the UN which are not likely to be lifted in the nearest future. Another participant to the competition for a dominant position in the region — Turkey — can be regarded as only (and solely) an American «agent of influence» in the region, since this country is not in a position to play an independent game either at present or in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s economy is quite equal to the task of taking the most active part in the oil pool development and reservoir engineering of the Caspian oil shelf. Importantly, the participation in such projects may be either in the form of employing Ukrainian specialists and workers for prospecting fields and extracting oil and gas or supplying processing and production lines and technologies available in Ukraine in sufficient quantity.

Moreover, as it is seen, in the situation which has arisen it is clearly not enough to limit oneself to only and solely traditional methods of diplomatic negotiations. Given the circumstance that in the countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, there are many ethnic Ukrainians, working in this area becomes for Ukraine extremely urgent and imperative, for tomorrow always means being too late. In the meantime, in Ukraine there are no real and efficient bilateral relations with representatives of the diaspora which could act as a sufficiently potent force in the political lobbying of Ukraine’s interests in the countries where they reside. We believe that making a state program of working with the diaspora of the «near abroad» a top priority in the sphere of Ukraine’s foreign policy becomes today a matter of greatest importance.

Doctor Rustam Mamedov drew attention to the fact that Caspian Sea is a source of geopolitical problems. For this reason the use of resources and potential of the Caspian Sea is the main priority of Azeri home and foreign policies. Another priority of Azeri foreign policy is the security of near Caspian region. The presenter enumerated such threats to regional security as terrorism, spread of weapons of mass destruction, interethnic interconfessional conflicts, slackening or suspen-sion of economic growth. Azerbaijan does not believe in the effectiveness of the CNS as to the creation of security guarantees and relies on NATO. The GUUAM rates of growth and its institutional development are not satisfying either.

Zurab Tchiaberashvili dwelt on the challenges that independent Georgia is facing. The major problem is to identify itself with the values Europe lives by. This is very important in discussing what is happening in the Transcaucasian region. Europe needs Georgia, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. In Europe, the understanding of this question is quite clear. Europe needs whole regions in which each country would reaffirm its readiness for cooperation rather than individual countries. So far the region where Georgia and Ukraine belong has failed to affirm itself as a good partner, therefore this may also be regarded as a reflection of the fact that we have a lot of internal problems which are hindering us now. Currently, Europeans begin to ponder how the Caucasus will develop. But, in my opinion, they are late in this respect. The point is that our reforms have been delayed very much, and we should not expect a fast way out of the situation. The USA has been the prime mover which has always prompted us to what we have now (I mean the Baku—Jeikhan pipeline and other oil—mains).

Georgia should review its internal problems in order to solve its problems in the region. Although we are discussing Georgia’s strategic document, there is no definiteness in this discussion, either. Until last September Shevardnadze used to say that Georgia wanted to join NATO, but now, that Georgia welcomes George Robertson, Shevardnadze keeps mum about this and does not repeat his wish. At present in Georgia no clear–cut questions have been formulated and there are no answers to them, this is why we find ourselves in the vicious circle of problems from which we can not break out. In my opinion, this is also a problem, like in other GUUAM countries. That is why when we speak about cooperation within the framework of the GUUAM, it should also imply cooperation both in forming democratic societies in our countries and with respect to its implementation by the governments, which will correspond to the interests of the respective peoples.

In his talk, Ihor Semyvolos said this: I support many points voiced by the previous speaker, Mr. Z. Chiaberashvili. I would like to note that that the drawing up of any concept of national security implies finding adequate responses to corresponding challenges. The viability of this state depends on to what degree the state or society can find such adequate answers. In the Caucasus, the major problem — that of protecting its independence — has not been solved. The Southern Caucasus continues to be a region in which states have not finally defined their identities.

What is the Caucasus — is it part of Europe or Asia? For a long time the Caucasus was a component part of this or that empire. In the past 300 years, the mentality and psychology of the Caucasian peoples have substantially changed, but to argue that the Caucasus has become part of Europe is too early; equally, it is wrong to say that the Caucasus has remained part of Asia. Now the Caucasus is an intermediary belt between Europe and Asia, and this is a serious challenge for the Caucasian peoples, because objective economic interests, the convenience of transportation and other arteries will increasingly connect the Caucasus with Asia rather than Europe. And even if we speak about the Baku—Jeikhan pipeline, we should not forget that Turkey is a Middle Eastern nation, although oil will go to Europe. That is why I think that we can speak about the similarity of Central Asia and the Caucasus and, therefore, we can speak about the concept of a so—called «Greater Middle East.» Importantly, this does not mean at all that when we speak about the Middle East, we mean something backward and something worse than Europe.

Another question concerns the claim that was put forward by the chairman of a conference in Yerevan (Armenia) in which we participated a week ago. This is the claim about the egotism of ruling elites. This is not only a Caucasian problem — it is typical of post–Soviet states. On the whole of the post–Soviet expanse we are witnessing the above–mentioned sad phenomenon. Elites which have shaped in the past several years actually exist for their own sake. They do not produce any new ideas, their only goal is self—preservation. By the highest standards, already they even do not represent the interests of the peoples from whom they come. The outcome of the activities of the above–mentioned national elites is an overblown strengthening of the status of law enforcement agencies, the underdeveloped nature and neglectfulness of civil society. Of all post–Soviet republics, only the Baltic states have managed to avoid this.

And there is one more question — that of conflicts. The very fact of «frozen» conflicts in the Caucasus is in itself a serious obstacle on the way of the Caucasus’ integration into Europe as it is. Whether we want it or not, given extant territorial claims, the integration of these nations into Europe is unacceptable to the community of European nations. Are these conflicts likely to be solved in the nearest future? Specifically, here we mean the conflicts on the territory of Georgia and around Nagorno–Karabakh. Now we should admit that nobody, including the EU, can solve these conflicts. Regretfully, Russia does not know either what is to be done with these conflicts – it has «frozen» them for the time being. The USA is weighing up whether it is worth taking an active part in the affairs of the region. In solving the Karabakh problem, which is very painful and arduous, we witness the effect of an absent mediator. The big game in the Caucasus is going on, the game being played on contradictions which seems to be interminable. As for the system of regional security, it is still far from its realization. When I was in Yerevan (Armenia), I came to know about a new idea — of the circles of security. In the present situation, Ukraine also finds its place within such circles.

In his talk Doctor Yevheniy Kozhokin noted that for every Russian each visit to Kyiv is important and thought—provoking. He touched upon a range of questions related to the threats to Russia’s security. Not wishing to comment on official documents which are rather well—known, he dwelt on the problems which are thoroughly analyzed at Russia’ Institute of Strategic Research. Proceeding from the significance of the current formulation of the security of the individual, society and state, he mentioned the problem arising from the situation in Chechnya as the greatest threat to Russia’s security. Chechnya is a crystal through which one can clearly see many problems and facets of security facing the citizens and the state of Russia. The events of 1999 — another bout of military operations – were unavoidable. Wherein did the major problem of Chechnya lie before the beginning of the military operations? The peculiar regime and economy formed in Chechnya after 1999 were based on several kinds of business. Number one which necessitated the central government’s interference was trade in people. Complete statistics are absent, but according to the Interior Ministry, more than 3500 persons were abducted for that period and with respect to them there were acts which can not be called other than a sophisticated form of trade.

These facts which are rather well–known in Russia remain, except for a narrow circle of specialists, unknown to the general public abroad.

Another problem which also is a challenge to the security of the individual, society and state in Russia is the problem of drugs which is drastically aggravating. In the past several years, prices for drugs, especially preparations from plants coming first of all from Afghanistan and Central Asia, have sharply dropped. In this respect, the Taliban accounts for a large part of drug supplies. As far as we know, this mischief has already stung Central Asian countries, too, and it is becoming ever more serious also for Ukraine and other European countries of the former Soviet Union. Now even Western nations increasingly experience this, too. It is obvious for us that this mischief can not be stopped using the forces of small special units of the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service. This matter requires a world–wide system of cooperation, involving both European countries and the USA. Regretfully, mutual understanding is only on the level of declarations but not on the level of specific joint actions. Moreover, international structures are simply procrastinating. If we take, for example, such structure as the Europol, we can say that this formal structure does not have real opportunities to control crime, especially narcobusiness.

There are two more sets of problems which I regard as important both for the individual, society and the state. The first problem is related to safeguarding Russian Federation’s sovereignty. Russia seems to be a great power which some our neighbors even continue to call mechanically a superpower. In my opinion, Russia has only two attributes of a superpower: nuclear weapons and permanent membership in the UN Security Council. For us the question of sovereignty is very crucial today. Its most graphic manifestation is in the sphere of economy, since Russia’s external debt has reached such heights that now it is impossible to say that we have retained possibilities of shaping our own optimal economic policy.

Another range of questions concerns the information sphere. We often maintain that mass media are the fourth estate, without giving much thought to the fact that by such a definition we actually formulate the problem. Principles of democracy, specifically, the principle of appointment by election and rotation, do not apply to the fourth estate. In this respect, both the legislative and executive branches become hostages of the fourth estate.

At the same time, mass media use their own principles of information presentation which are radically different from the method of information presentation in diplomatic services, because mass media operate under market conditions a

Розділ І

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА ПРІОРИТЕТИ ПОЛІТИКИ І СТРАТЕГІЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ КРАЇН ЄВРОАТЛАНТИЧНОЇ СПІЛЬНОТИ

James SHERR, UK

PARTICULARITIES AND PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF UK

I am honoured to be invited once again by the ISS to express my personal thoughts about European security and about Ukraine’s security prospects. May I emphasise that I am not an official, but an expert employed by officials, and my views do not necessarily correspond to those of the UK Ministry of Defence or the British government.

As we all know, on 29 September certain changes took place in the system of state management of foreign policy of Ukraine. Many of you doubtless wish to know how the UK and other Western countries will react. The answer is that we don’t yet know how to react. But it is a good moment for such a conference and for all of us to speak about fundamentals and speak plainly. It is also a good moment to state that despite the immense amount we have accomplished in a relationship extending over nine years, the UK and the West as a whole is not always sure where it stands with Ukraine. Yet any Westerner who reflects seriously on recent events should also recognise that Ukraine is not always sure where it stands with the West. Is British national security strategy partially to blame?

In part, the answer is probably yes, and one reason is that in the post–Cold War period, the UK has not had a national security strategy. What we have had is a vision of the kind of Europe we would like to see and a view about certain policies which might help realise that vision. Not only the British government, but the mainstream of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat opposition parties are committed to a Europe and a broader Euro–Atlantic security community which respects and stimulates diversity, but which at the same time is inclusive, which is drawing together and which at a national as well as international level is developing the institutions which make it possible for people to draw together. This includes those people who trade and invest and who will only trade with and invest in foreign countries if the rules are clear, the rules are sensible and the rules are enforced. In our view, where Europe is concerned, there will be no lasting international security without national security, and there will be no national security until it is unmistakably clear that governments put national interests before private interests and until the majority of a country’s citizens begin to feel that they are the architects of their own fortunes. In large measure, therefore, the British view of security can be termed «bottom–up».

But in Ukraine, we often come away with the impression that the dominant view of security is top–down: that security is seen to be the product of «programmes», «strategies», membership of international bodies and, in the last analysis agreements between governments. We often are left with the impression that Ukraine is more interested in integration with European structures than in undertaking the concrete institutional changes that would enable Ukraine to integrate with Europe. We also encounter the view admittedly to a far lesser extent in Ukraine than in Russia — that the enlargement of the Western security community is a threat to security and a process which threatens to draw lines across Europe. The danger that the West might «draw new lines» by means of NATO and EU enlargement is certainly not non–existent. But I would suggest that it is not the real danger, and it is not the point. The fact is that, wherever we look, lines already are being drawn by internal developments, by different patterns of internal change and internal stagnation in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Without any intervention from outside, frontiers are being established by the differences between political cultures and business cultures. By definition, «integration» is the drawing together of these cultures. If those who speak of «integration» do nothing to adopt Euro–Atlantic, i.e. Western, norms of law, business practice, accountability, responsibility and transparency, they are just uttering a slogan. In Central and Eastern Europe today, a line is forming between those who have produced slogans and those who have produced changes. Today, we face a risk that this line will become a barrier and that a number of countries will find themselves on the wrong side of it.

If this is the problem, then the challenge for the West is obvious: to use the institutions it has — first and foremost, NATO and the European Union — to counteract these tendencies and to put our energies into integrating those who really wish to be integrated. And to leave others alone. If this is the challenge, then the shortcomings of our institutions are twofold. First, their spokesmen have sometimes spoken too loudly, too ambitiously and too arrogantly, creating illusions on the part of those who wish to «join the West» and deepening the apprehensions of those who do not. Second, they have sometimes acted too timidly; they have been insufficiently proactive, systematic, determined — but at the same time insufficiently patient — in strengthening those who have a real chance of turning aims into reality. It is with these challenges in mind that I offer the following comments about the role of NATO and the European Union.

NATO is and will remain a security organisation. For this reason, there is little that NATO can do to stimulate investment in Ukraine or help Ukraine restructure industry or reduce unemployment. On its own, NATO cannot integrate Ukraine into Europe. But it can facilitate Ukraine’s integration in one important respect: by helping Ukraine devise an integrated and cost–effective national security and defence system which can respond to today’s new but very real threats. The decisions by Ukraine to draw up a new State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development — and involve NATO experts in its conception and implementation — were significant decisions, and they add to the possibility that NATO—Ukraine cooperation will become even more meaningful. The proposals brought to NATO Headquarters on 5 October by the High Level Group on Defence Reform further strengthen that possibility. It is not only in Ukraine’s interest but Europe’s interest that Ukraine possess a defence and security system able to police and protect borders, deal with the consequences of environmental disasters, contain local conflicts and persuade outsiders that the cost of «provocations», «active measures» and other forms of interference would outweigh the gain. Unless Ukraine takes real steps to create such a system, its path to Europe will be blocked.

Yet Ukraine and its NATO partners should not forget that NATO also has a more classical security function. Should Ukraine come under pressure to change its geopolitical course, the imperative for NATO will not be to provide more «programmes of cooperation», but concrete and timely support. Such support must begin by reiterating firmly and to all relevant parties the West’s active interest in a Ukraine which, in President Kuchma’s words, remains «free to choose» its policies, its partners and its direction of development. But if Ukraine does not seek support from NATO, it will be hard for NATO to provide it. The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership envisaged consultation in difficult times as well as good ones. Not only the NATO—Ukraine Commission, but all NATO—Ukraine mechanisms and relationships are forums for consultation. The frankness and depth of consultation will always be the best indicator of the depth of our relationship and the level of trust that exists between us.

Unlike NATO, the European Union is not, first and foremost, a security organisation. But it has every potential to become the prime engine of integration in central and eastern Europe. «Potential» is the operative word. For if EU members turn away from the challenge of creating a wider Europe, they will become a fraternity of inward looking states, and they will polarise the continent. Mindful of this potential and this danger, both the Conservative government of John Major and the Labour government of Tony Blair have been active proponents of EU enlargement. More controversially, the present government has also been an active proponent, indeed an architect of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which the European Council agreed to establish in June 1999. Leadership of the Conservative Party has not hidden its concern that ESDP could undermine NATO and the Trans–Atlantic relationship and on this basis announced on 11 June this year that a future Conservative government would cease to participate in the initiative. What principles should be kept in mind as the EU embarks upon these two significant changes? I would suggest four.

1. It is essential that the EU be alert and attuned to the security implications of its actions. For too long the internal culture of the EU bureaucracy has been focused on economics rather than security, and the deepening integration of existing members rather than the enlargement of Europe. If the ESDP contributes to this shift in focus, it will play a positive role.

2. But it cannot play such a role if ESDP develops in rivalry with NATO or if its members discourage the United States, Canada, Norway, Turkey and Switzerland from playing a full and active role in the affairs of this continent. Today, members of the European Union have no will — and mercifully no intention — to duplicate or replace NATO’s distinct, specialized and costly infrastructure, and it is difficult to imagine when they will. Those who want ESDP to contribute to security — and produce tangible military capabilities — recognise that it is likely to involve more collaboration with NATO rather than less. This would certainly be the wish of most Group I and the majority of Group 2 candidates for EU membership, all of whom are Euro–Atlantic in their orientation. If EU enlargement develops apace with ESDP, the result should not only be a more Europeanised NATO but a more Atlanticised European Union. This outcome is not inevitable, but it is realisable, and its realisation would strengthen the security and self–confidence of new and candidate members.

3. The EU must decide whether it wants to be a magnet or barrier. We all want the EU to be a barrier against trans–national crime, terrorism and illegal migration. But we do not want the EU to be a barrier against countries. For this reason, it would be very damaging if the EU interpreted his acquis communautaire in such a way as to thwart — or, worse still arrest — trade and cooperation between neighbours and the knitting together of regions. Implemented flexibly and at reasonable timetables, elements of the acquis like the Schengen accord can stimulate beneficial change on the part of the EU’s neighbours. But a rapid and rigid implementation of Schengen will produce demoralisation, despair and division in Europe.

4. Finally, countries like Ukraine which wish in the short term to draw closer to the EU and in the long term enter it must not have illusions about the nature of the EU and the nature of this process. The «European process» is a process of integration. The primary concern of the EU, therefore, is not a country’s external policies, but its internal policies. By definition, drawing closer to the EU involves the growing intemalisation of ELJ standards and norms and the progressive involvement of the EU in one’s internal affairs. If this is not desired, or at the least accepted, than EU membership should not be adopted as a strategic goal.

Conclusion

Today many of us in the UK and the Western community are beginning to wonder whether our vision of a wider, inclusive Europe is achievable. We are also beginning to wonder whether the old dividing line separating «Western Europe» from «Eastern Europe» will simply move east and become a line separating «Central Europe» from «Eastern Europe». If this happens, the new line is not likely to be drawn on the basis of national, ethnic and religious factors, as Samuel Huntington and the followers of Gumilev have forecast. It more likely to be drawn by differences of political and economic culture: by divergent beliefs and divergent practices regarding politics and authority, responsibility and initiative, economics and business, information and transparency, law and crime. These differences, of course, reflect our different histories, but they are not expressions of historical inevitаbility. What follower of Gumilev would have predicted that Germany (which now spends less than two per cent of its GDP on defence) would be one of the least «militaristic» countries in Europe, that «traditionally authoritarian» Spain would be one of Europe’s most vigorous democracies or that Poland would be a model of economic growth and prosperity? The notion that Ukrainians are doomed to remain part of a «former Soviet space» because they are an «East Slavic» people is not only fatalistic and unhistorical. It is anti–Ukrainian, because it would deprive Ukraine of that «freedom to choose» which is a fundamental right of any people and any state.

What Ukraine becomes depends considerably on Europe and even partially on the United Kingdom. But it depends first and foremost on Ukraine.

Today it is not difficult to explain in geopolitical terms why Ukraine is a «pivotal» factor in European security, as two British governments and two Secretary Generals of NATO have proclaimed.

But whilst Western decision makers listen to geopolitical arguments, they do not live in a geopolitical culture. Geopolitical arguments are heard in the West, but they are not enough in Britain. Where is Ukraine going? What is Ukraine’s direction?

If asked these questions today, I would honestly have to reply, I don’t know.

Let us hope that before another nine years elapse, our decision–makers will not only get a positive answer to this question. Let us hope they will be able to answer it for themselves.

Стейсі КЛОССОН, США