Cognitive development and language

One of the intriguing abilities that language users have is the ability to refer to things or states of being that are not in the immediate vision of the speaker. This ability is often related to the theory of mind, or an awareness of the other. According to Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch (2002), there are six main aspects of this high-level reference system:

Theory of mind

Capacity to acquire nonlinguistic conceptual representations, such as the object/kind distinction;

Referential vocal signals;

Imitation as a rational, intentional system;

Voluntary control over signal production as evidence of intentional communication;

Number representation.

Simon Baron-Cohen (1999) argues that theory of mind must have preceded language use, based on evidence of use of the following characteristics as much as 40,000 years ago: intentional communication, repairing failed communication, teaching, intentional persuasion, intentional deception, building shared plans and goals, intentional sharing of focus or topic, and pretending. Moreover, Baron-Cohen argues that many primates show some, but not all, of these abilities. Call and Tomasello’s research on chimpanzees supports this, in that individual chimps seem to understand that other chimps have awareness, knowledge, and intention, but do not seem to understand false beliefs. Many primates show some tendencies toward a theory of mind, but not a full one as humans have. Ultimately, there is some consensus within the field that the development of a full theory of mind in humans was a necessary precursor to full language use.